Israel Vs. Iran

Barring a "catastrophic development," Middle East Newsline reports, President Bush has decided not to
attack Iran. An administration source explains that Washington deems Iran's
cooperation "needed for a withdrawal [of American forces] from Iraq."

If correct, this implies the Jewish state stands alone against a
regime that threatens to " wipe Israel off the map" and is building the
nuclear weapons to do so. Israeli leaders are hinting that their patience is
running out; Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz just warned that
"diplomatic efforts should bear results by the end of 2007."

Can the Israel Defense Force in fact disrupt Iran's nuclear
program?

Top-secret analysis from intelligence agencies normally reply to
such a question. But talented outsiders, using open sources, can also try their
hand. Whitney Raas and Austin Long studied this problem at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and published their impressive analysis, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to
Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities ," in the journal International
Security.

Ms. Raas and Mr. Long focus exclusively on feasibility, not
political desirability or strategic ramifications. Were the Israeli national
command to decide to damage the Iranian infrastructure, could its forces
accomplish this mission? The authors consider five components of a successful
strike:

Intelligence: To impede the production of fissile material
requires incapacitating only three facilities of Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
In ascending order of importance, these are the heavy water plant and plutonium
production reactors under construction at Arak, a uranium conversion facility in
Isfahan, and a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Destroying the Natanz facility, in
particular, they note, "is critical to impeding Iran's progress toward
nuclearization."

Ordnance: To damage all three facilities with reasonable confidence
requires â€" given their size, their being underground, the weapons available to
the Israeli forces, and other factors â€" twenty-four 5,000-lb. weapons and
twenty-four 2,000-lb. weapons.

Platforms: Noting the "odd amalgamation of technologies" available
to the Iranians and the limitations of their fighter planes and ground defenses
to stand up to the high-tech Israeli air force, Ms. Raas and Mr. Long calculate
that the IDF needs a relatively small strike package of 25 Fâ€"15Is and 25
Fâ€"16Is.

Routes: Israeli jets can reach their targets via three paths:
Turkey to the north, Jordan and Iraq in the middle, or Saudi Arabia to the
south. In terms of fuel and cargo, the distances in all three cases are
manageable.

Defense forces: Rather than predict the outcome of an
Israeli-Iranian confrontation, the authors calculate how many Israeli planes
would have to reach their three targets for the operation to succeed. They
figure 24 planes must reach Natanz, six to Isfahan, and five to Arak, or 35
altogether. Turned around, that means the Iranian defenders minimally must stop
16 of 50 planes, or one-third of the strike force. The authors consider this
attrition rate "considerable" for Natanz and "almost unimaginable" for the other
two targets.

In all, Ms. Raas and Mr. Long find that the relentless
modernization of Israel's air force gives it "the capability to destroy even
well-hardened targets in Iran with some degree of confidence." Comparing an
Iranian operation to Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor,
which was a complete success, they find that this one "would appear to be no
more risky" than the earlier one.

The great question mark hanging over the operation, one that the
authors do not speculate about, is whether any of the Turkish, Jordanian,
American, or Saudi governments would acquiesce to Israeli penetration of their
air spaces. (Iraq, recall, is under American control.) Unless the Israelis win
advance permission to cross these territories, their jets might have to fight
their way to Iran. More than any other factor, this one imperils the entire
project. (The IDF could reduce this problem by flying along borders, for
example, the Turkey-Syria one, permitting both countries en route to claim that
Israeli planes were in the other fellow's air space.)

That Israeli forces have "a reasonable chance of success"
unilaterally to destroy key Iranian nuclear facilities could help deter Tehran
from proceeding with its weapons program. The Raas-Long study, therefore, makes
a diplomatic deal more likely. Its results deserve the widest possible
dissemination.