Not quite the way I view it, but the same conclusion
Hossein Askari, in The National Interest:
Could change come to Iran in as peaceful a way as what we just witnessed in Egypt, or is the Iranian case fundamentally different?
Egypt under Mubarak was a secular dictatorship. Although the Iranian regime is a de facto military dictatorship, it is not secular and advertises itself as a religious democracy and the defender of Islam—a religion, lest the mullahs forget, based on legitimate governance and social justice!
Egypt’s revolution has largely been about economic deprivation, unemployment, widespread corruption and the absence of hope for a better future. To the contrary, during their revolution in 1979, Iranian protesters railed vehemently against their regime’s social and political failures and against its subservient relationship with a foreign power, namely, the United States. Nor has the Egyptian revolution been infused with religious overtones. But today’s unrest in Iran closely echoes the Egyptian revolution. Iranians face economic hardships as never before. Recent university graduates are leaving the country in record numbers because they have little hope for a better future. Most Iranians no longer resent the United States and would in fact welcome better relations between Tehran and Washington.
There are undoubtedly numerous historical and social reasons for the relatively peaceful nature of the Egyptian revolution, but most prominent in this is the role of the military. The Egyptian military perceived its primary mission as upholding peace and stability while recognizing the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the Egyptian people. Although the Egyptian military has vast economic interests, it did not view the people’s demands as a threat to these interests. At the same time, the Egyptian military has received significant financial support from the United States and has enjoyed close working relations with the U.S. military since the signing of the peace accord with Israel. This close relationship appears to have provided Washington with a channel for achieving a peaceful exit for Mubarak and his cronies.
The Iranian military sees itself differently.The military, more specifically its important component the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), sees itself not as the protector of the Iranian people but as the defender of the regime. If the regime is threatened, the IRGC considers itself threatened. This was not the case in Egypt. A fundamental reason for this is the difference in the economic interests of the IRGC in Iran as opposed to those of the Egyptian military. In Iran the economic interests of the IRGC are more pervasive and brazen than those of the Egyptian military: not only do they have vast ownership in the Iranian economy, they also receive large government contracts in areas in which they have no expertise, such as developing a sector of Iran’s vast gas field (which it shares with Qatar) in the Persian Gulf.
In essence, the leaders of the IRGC view their economic fortunes as tied to the clerical regime and the puppet president. If the regime goes so does the IRGC’s religious cover and its vast economic fortune. In Egypt the military’s economic interests are not directly threatened by the dismissal of the Mubarak regime and may in fact not fare badly given the ongoing popular support they enjoy.
These clear differences in the role of the military in the two dictatorial regimes suggest that it is unlikely the ongoing conflict in Iran will follow the path of the revolution in Egypt.