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The NIE, Iran, and accuracy regarding nuclear weapons

The National Intelligence Estimate which this morning is the center of some controversial claims can be downloaded HERE. It is based on information the national intelligence community has judged to be accurate as of 10/3/07

Keys:

This NIE is an extensive reexamination of the issues in the May 2005 assessment.
This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:
• What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?
• What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?
• What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?
• What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear
weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over
another?
• What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our
key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?
This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons.

Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that
varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of
confidence to our assessments, as follows:
• High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality
information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.
A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still
carry a risk of being wrong.

THE MONEY LINES:

Key Judgments
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon.

In essence, this NIE is saying, whoops? The basis of our foreign policy assumptions, and estimates from 2003 until October have been DEAD WRONG?

I don't hear the sound of heads rolling, somewhere. This is either a serious mistake, or we have made a serious mistake.
The American people need to know why.
Or is this Karl Rove's way of helping Mr. Obama?
More likely that we have some kind of play to isolate Israel in the forlorn hope that the Sunni gulf states will adhere to American policy, while passing this entire mess downstream to a different president.
Mr. Bush from the outside, given what has been going on with Condi and her ABSURD statements regarding peace in the middle east, appears from the outside to simply have been burnt out.

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